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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Digital Technology and the Future of Privacy: 
Carpenter v. United States 
Carpenter v. United States 
138 S. Ct. 2006 (2018) 
In the modern world, some of our deepest secrets are held by 
third parties who store data gathered by our computers, cell 
phones, and smart homes.  Under previous doctrine as developed 
in Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller, an individual 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in data voluntarily 
exposed to third parties.1  Justice Sotomayor recently called upon 
the Court to reexamine this third-party doctrine because “this 
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”2  In Carpenter v. United 
States, the Court rejected the third-party doctrine’s application to 
historical cell-site location information (CSLI) that can be used to 
track an individual’s historical movements for seven days or 
more.3  Moreover, it recognized that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical 
movements, and it laid the groundwork for future rulings to 
protect the privacy of the troves of data collected as a result of 
“seismic shifts in digital technology.”4 
In a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the United 
States Supreme Court held that individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of in the tracking of physical movement captured 
CSLI records held by third-party wireless service providers, and 
the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of this data.  In 2011, 
1. 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979); 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
2. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
3. 138 S. Ct. 2006, 2216–17 & n.3 (2018).
4. Id. at 2217, 2219.
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police obtained confessions that implicated Timothy Carpenter in 
a series of robberies in Michigan and Ohio.  They used these 
confessions to apply for a 2703(d) order under the Stored 
Communications Act to access Carpenter’s historical CSLI for a 
four-month period when the robberies occurred.  The 
Government obtained data from Carpenter’s cell phone service 
providers that included a historical log showing which cell towers 
his phone had connected to in order to make or receive calls.  In 
total, the Government obtained 12,898 data points regarding 
Carpenter’s movements. 
Before Carpenter’s trial for robbery and firearms violations, 
Carpenter moved to suppress the CSLI, arguing that the seizure 
of the records violated his Fourth Amendment Rights because it 
was not based upon a warrant supported by probable cause, but 
rather upon a 2703(d) order which requires a lower standard, akin 
to reasonable suspicion. The motion was denied, and the 
government’s experts used the data at trial to produce maps that 
placed Carpenter’s cell phone near four of the robberies.  The 
CSLI was key to Carpenter’s conviction.  Carpenter appealed to 
the Sixth Circuit which affirmed the lower court’s ruling.  The 
Supreme Court reversed and held that the government’s 
acquisition of CSLI was a Fourth Amendment Search, subject to 
a warrant requirement. 
The Carpenter decision is the third recent case grappling 
with technological developments that allow a heretofore 
unimaginable intrusion into privacy.5  In these decisions, the 
Court has acknowledged that applying precedent that based a 
reasonable expectations of privacy upon analogies to numbers 
dialed from a land line,6 cigarette packs in pockets,7 and beepers 
in industrial containers8 may be akin to “saying a ride on 
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the 
moon.”9 
5. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (requiring a warrant to search a
cell phone incident to arrest because a “cell phone search would typically expose to the 
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house. . . .”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 
411–3 (requiring a warrant to monitor a vehicle’s movements through a GPS tracker). 
6. Smith v. Maryland,  442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979).
7. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
8. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
9. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
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Unfortunately, Carpenter never hit escape velocity to take 
us beyond the pull of the third-party doctrine.  The Court went out 
of its way to explain that the ruling was narrow and did “not 
disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question 
surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor 
do we address other business records that might incidentally 
reveal location information.”10  Despite the protests, it did indeed 
cabin Smith and Miller by “declin[ing] to extend . . . [them] to 
cover these novel circumstances,” namely to “a qualitatively 
different category of . . . records” that “when Smith was decided 
in 1979, few could have imagined. . . . “11 
So, it appears that the third-party doctrine is no longer a 
bright-line rule that whatever is voluntarily exposed to a third-
party has no reasonable expectation of privacy, but rather it has 
now become a fact-intensive analysis whenever a search involves 
(1) “an entirely different species of business record”12 (2) that is
“not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”13  “Not
truly shared,” the Court explains, is when “in no meaningful sense
does the user voluntarily assume the risk of turning over a
comprehensive dossier of his physical movements” because the
information is gathered “without any affirmative act on the part
of the user beyond powering up.”14
The Court is (perhaps intentionally) less clear what belongs 
within this qualitatively different category of records.  Does it 
include precise location data collected by a cell phone app such 
as Uber, Google Maps, or Tinder?  ECG data from an Apple 
Watch?  Eavesdropping by Siri or Alexa?  Cell tower dumps? 
Real-time GPS tracking?  Future litigants will determine the 
contours of the “world of difference between the limited types of 
personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the 
exhaustive chronicle of . . . information casually collected. . . 
today.”15  For now, we only know that the Fourth Amendment 
10. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2006, 2220 (2018).
11. Id. at 2216–17. 
12. Id. at 2222.
13. Id. at 2220.
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 2219.
820 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:3 
protects historical cell phone location data used to track physical 
movements for seven days or more.16 
SIGNIFICANT CASES IN BRIEF: 
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
The National Collegiate Athletic Associate challenged the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act which prohibited 
additional states from legalizing sports gambling.  Federal 
prohibition of sports was unconstitutional commandeering 
because it prescribed what a state legislature could and could not 
do.  This state-rights holding has broad implications for sanctuary 
cities and state legalization of marijuana. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n., 138 S. Ct 1719 (2018). 
A baker challenged Colorado antidiscrimination law when 
he and his company were found in violation because he refused 
to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple due to his religious 
beliefs.  In an extremely narrow ruling, the Court held that how 
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission treated the petitioner with 
prohibited anti-religious animus.  The broader significance of the 
case is the extension of the holding in Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enterprises, Inc. that a business cannot cite religious reasons to 
avoid public accommodations antidiscrimination requirements to 
include sexual orientation.  Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727, 1733 
n.* (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 
(1968)). 
Janus v. AFSCME,  
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
Petitioner was a state employee who worked in a unionized 
unit in Illinois state government, but who chose not to join the 
union.  He challenged the requirement that pay an agency fee, 
claiming it was compelled speech.  The Court overruled  Abood 
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and held that the
First Amendment is offended when nonconsenting public sector
16. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2006, 2216–17 & n.3 (2018).
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employees are required to pay agency fees to unions.  This 
decision undermines public sector unions since they will now 
have to provide agency services to nonunion members without 
compensation, and it may raise issues under the Takings Clause. 
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
A California statute required  licensed pregnancy counseling 
centers to disseminate information about how to obtain a state-
funded abortion and required unlicensed pregnancy crisis centers 
to post disclaimers that their services did not include medical 
assistance.  The Christian centers sought injunctive relief, 
claiming that the requirements constituted compelled speech in 
violation of the First Amendment. The Court held that the 
requirement unduly burdened the centers’ speech.  The decision 
has significant implications for existing state statutes requiring 
physicians to give patients state-prescribed information before 
obtaining an abortion. 
South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
South Dakota challenged the physical presence rule from 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) that held that it 
was a violation of the Commerce Clause to tax goods and services 
sold to buyers in the state when the seller had no physical 
presence in the state.  The Court overruled Quill and held that it 
did not violate the Commerce Clause to tax goods and services 
sold to buyers in the state when the seller had no physical 
presence in the state.  The ruling has broad implications for sales 
over the internet because states can now tax sellers without local 
presence. 
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
Employees entered an agreement with their employers to 
individually arbitrate employment disputes and waive class and 
collective proceedings.  Employees sued, claiming that the 
arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the National 
822 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:3 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  The Court held that individual 
arbitration agreements do not violate the NLRA, and agreements 
to arbitrate under the Fair Labor Standards Act or the 
corresponding state statues are enforceable under the Federal 
Arbitration Act.  The decision will encourage employers to seek 
broader arbitration agreements from employees. 
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